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IN THR SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by .and through
Director Assistance Payment
Administration, Utah State
Department of Social Service,
Plaintiff-Respondent

Supreme Court No. 16551

-vLESTER ROMERO, a/k/a
RALPH G. ROMERO I
Defendant-Appellant.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the State of Utah against
the Defendant to recover public assistance payments fraudulently
obtained by the Defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LONER COURT
This case was heard

by the trial court on its merits and

the lower court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff in
the amount of $11,981.21 with costs.

(R.49).

The trial court

held that the judgment represented public assistance which the
Defendant had fraudulently obtained by supplying false information
to the State and by withholding material information with the
intent to obtain public assistance to which he was not entitled.
(R.49,50).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, State of Utah, seeks an affirmance of the
trail court's decision.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant applied for public assistance on February
11, 1969, and began to receive public assistance intermittently from February, 1969 through November, 1973.

The total

amount of public assistance paid by the State to the Appellant
was Eleven Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-one and 21/100 Dollars
($11' 981. 21) .
The State discontinued the assistance oayments to
Appellant when it had gathered evidence indicating that Appellant had made several misrepresentations on his application
forms.

The alleged misrepresentations included Appellant's

annual income, his employment, his real ?roperty owned and
transferred, and his wife's employment.

As a result of the

alleged misrepresentations, an attorney for the State, who is
no longer

employed by the State of Utah, filed a complaint to

recover the assistance from Appellant on January 11, 1974.
(R.

2-3).

I

On April 5, 1974, the Appellant filed several discovery!
requests (R.6-l5), and on July 18, 1978, an attorney for
Respondent newly assigned to this matter answered the discovery
requests.

(R.23-3l).

Throughout the discovery

period and

during the trial of this case on its merits, Appellant never
once raised the issue of Respondents delay in answering the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

j

discovery requests and never requested that this case be set
for trial.

Thus, on September 15, 1978, Respondent reauested

a trial setting for this matter.

(R.32).

On May 22, 1979, a pre-trial conference was held before
Judge G. Hal Taylor, who concluded that no further continuance
of this case would be granted unless a judge was not available,
and that the defendant had sufficient notice of trial to (1)
be ready to proceed, and (2) either have an attorney or be
prepared to proceed pro se.

(R.36).

On June 13, 1979, the

trial of this case on its merits was begun notwithstanding
Appellant's request for a continuance, for the first time, on
the morning of trial, in Judge Conder's chambers, the Defendant
asked the court to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute
and for laches.

(R.79,84).

The trial of this case was concluded

on June 15, 1979 with the court ruling in favor of Respondent
and granting judgment for Respondent in the amount of

~11,981.21

plus costs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S ARGUM~NTS THAT ~~RE NOT RAISED IN THE
PLEADINGS NOR PUT IN ISSUE AT THE TRIAL CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
Arguments one through three of the Appellant's brief
are now being presented to this court for the first time on appeal.
These issues, the basis of Appellant's arguments, were never
put in issue in any form through pleadinas, motion, or at trial.
These arguments are therefore improperly before this court and
are not to be considered.

The Utah Supreme Court has been

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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consistent in stating over the years that: "matters neither rai
in the pleadings nor put in issue at trial cannot be considered
for the first time on appeal."

Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d

366, 482 P.2d 702, 704 (1971).

See also , Park City Utah Corp.

Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 450 (1978), Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405
and others to numerous to cite.
The main basis for this confirmed position of the court
is that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction with the exception of
extraordinary writs, is apPellate only.

State v. Kinder, 14 Uta'

2d 199, 381 P.2d 82 (1963); and Utah Const. art. VIII §4.
Regarding this position, this court has said:
"The essential criterion of 'appellate
jurisdiction' is that it revises and corrects
the proceedings in a cause already instituted
and does not create that cause.
In reference
to judicial tribunals, an appellate jurisdiction,
therefore, necessarily implies that the subjectmatter has been already instituted in an acted
upon by some other court, whose judgment or
proceedings are to be revised . . . The jurisdiction to consider and decide causes de novo is in
its essence 'original jurisdiction." State v.
Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1941).
Thus, the trial court's purpose is to frame the issues:
and render a decision on appropriate evidence presented to it,

1

while the appellate court's purpose is to review those matters!
I

which the trial court has already decided and

rul~d

on and

not rule on matters not raised at the lower level.

j

If this Court was to consider the Apcellant's first
three arguments, it would be assuming original jurisdiction ir.
present case.

In other words, the Supreme Court would be

decUl

issues that were never acted on nor decided bv the District
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Such a position by the Court would place in jeopardy the
District court's jurisdiction in civil matters, and the right
to have matters tried by the lower court.

To preserve this

jurisdiction, and to ensure that matters are raised in the
lower court where they should be, the Utah Supreme Court has
stated in Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446, 450
(1978).
"Where a party neither raises an issue in its
pleadings nor presents it to the trial court,
the issue cannot be considered for the first
time on appeal."
Respondents would further like to point out to the
court that parties cannot lead or allow the trial court to error
at the trial level, and then if a satisfactory result is not
achieved, raise these new matters on appeal if they were not
to their liking below.

Respondents do not believe there was

error, but even if it could be so construed, feel that the
Utah Supreme court has spoken:

In Ludlow v. Colbrado Animal

By-Products Co. 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943), the court
stated:
"A party who takes a position which either
leads a court into error or by conduct
approves the error committed by the court,
cannot later take advantage of such error in
procedure .•
It is clear from the entire record, that the conduct of
Appellant allowed, consented, or acquiesed in the actions of the
court -- moving ahead

and holding trial on the issues --

without saying anythinq bv wav of ob-iection.

To declare now

that Appellant's claims are valid and that error existed is
an "after-the-fact" argument which must be rejected as

Leing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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when in fact no such prejudice existed or has been shown.
POINT II
SINCE NO MOTION NAS "1ADE AT THE TRIAL LEVEL
CONCERNING RESPONDENT'S DISCOVERY ANSWERS, THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THIS CASE
TO BE TRIED ON ITS ~£RITS.
Appellant contends that this case should have been
dismissed by thebwer court because of the delay of filing
Appellant's answers to the discovery requests.

Sanctions

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are not self-executing
and never have been.

The contention of Appellant that the

trial judge should have dismissed this case without any motion
being made by Appellant is not substantiated or sound.

If such

were allowed or ruled the correct procedure of this court, the
trial judges would then be placed in a position that would rew
trial judges to be a third advocate, and to become judicially
active in each case,

thus changing the nature of actions from

that of "Plaintiff vs Defendant" to an unwritten third

party

situation of "Court vs. Plaintiff and Plaintiff vs. Defendant
and Court vs. Defendant."
Respondent agrees that there are perhaps those cases
I

where the court on its own may find the situation such that in·'
dependent rulings are made.
been the rule.
trial court.

But such is not, or has it ever

Such is, if anything, in the discretion

'

oft~

In the instant case, the trial court exercised

its discretion to proceed.
discretion was raised belm·?.

No objection to the exercise of
Since the sanctions of the rule'

are not self executing and since there has been no showino or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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must be sustained.
Respondent deems it important, however, to point out
to the court that none of the cases cited by Appellant involve
"self executing" rules.

In each instance motions were brought

before the court for rulings.

For example, in Schmitt v. Billings,

et.al., No. 16084 (Utah, filed August 24, 1979) cited by Appellant),
the Plaintiff filed a summary judqment at the trial level to have
the requests for admission admitted when the defendant failed
to answer.

And in W.B. Gardner Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc.,

568 P.2d 734

(1977)

(cited by Appellant), the pla2ntiff filed a

motion for summary judqment and a motion for default judgment with
the trial court when the defendant did not respond to the
discovery requests.
Counsel for Respondent is involved with a separate case
now when he filed reouests for Admissions and Interrogatories
over six months ago, and because other counsel had problems
getting information, allowed the answers and admissions to be
filed without further notice to the court.

To say that the

present filing of those documents is a futile exercise and
disallowed is an injustice to the party.
sides to the issues before the court.

There are always two

If one partv acouiesces in

the extensions or delavs of the other oarty, then it can be assumed,
and in fact must be accepted, that he is allowing extra time to
see that proper information is forthcoming and that the trial
should go on.

If he thinks otherwise, the avenues 6f bringing

the matter before the court for determination are as much a
reality for one party as well as another.

Appellant has no one

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to complain to but himself for his action or lack of action.
In the cases cited by

Appe~lant,

the trial judge did

not rule on the failure of one to respond to discovery reouests
until a motion was made by a party to the action.
so here.

That is not

Since no motion was made at the trial£vel by the

Appellant to impose the sanctions of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the trial court did not err in permitting this
case to be tried on its merits.

At such trial level,

at least, Respondent would have been able to present its side.
It, not being part of this record is not relevant to the actim
here, but answers were timely prepared and signed and apparent!
filed in 1974, but when counsel who presently handles the case
took over in 1978, learned they were not part of the
resubmitted them bearing the 1978 date.

record~

If such information

been presented to the trial court in response to appropriate
motion of Appellant, the trial court would still have had his
discretion to rule.

I

Since that had not happened here, Appelk

is attempting to have this court make a decision without the
opportunity of learning the facts.

Such a oosition should be

rejected.
POINT III
ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A DELAY IN ANSWERING APPELLANT'S
DISCOVERY REQUESTS, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT :SRR
IN PER!-HTTING THE PRESENT CASE TO BE TRIED ON ITS
MERITS.
Even if there is supoort for

~opellant's

position

that the trial judge should have dismissed this case without
a motion, such a decision would still be in the discretion
the trial judge.

ho

c:
_I

The Utah Supreme Court stated the follo'-''lf,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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when discussing the sanctions of Rule 37 of the U.R.C.P.:
"The language of the rule as presently worded
is permissive, rather than mandatory, wherein it
states: that the court ' ... may make such orders ..•
as are just, and ... may take any action etc.'
This grants the court discretionary authority
to impose the sanctions mentioned." (Carmen v.
Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976); see also
U.R.C.P. Rule 37(d). Emphasis Added).
Thus, the trial judge in using his discretion could have decided
that it was just to allow this case to go to trial for any of the
following reasons;

(1) No motion was made by Appellant for

dismissal on discovery grounds,

(2) Appellant had eleven months

to prepare his case for trial after the answers to the discovery
requests were filed,

(3) When the case finally went to trial

Appellant was still not ready to defend himself, and (4) the
trial judge could be following the Utah Supreme Courts' "consistent
po~_icy

of resolving doubts in favor of permitting parties to

have their day in court on the merits of che controversy."
Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342, 344 (Utah 1978); see also
Carmen v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 501 (Utah 1976).
For whatever reason the trial judge had in allowing this
case to go to trial, his decision was based on having all the
circumstances of the case close at hand.

This court has stated

the following when a decision is left to the judge's discretion;
"In situations where the exercise of discretion is
appropriate, considerable weight should be given to
the determination of the trial court, whichever way it
goes.
This is true because due to his close involvement with the Parties, the witnesses, and the total circumstances of the case, he is in the best position to
judge what the interests of justice reauire in safeguarding the rights and interests of all parties
concerned." Barber v. Calder, 522, P.2d 700,702(Utah 1974).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The trial judge was in the best position to decide whether this
case should go to trial, and he decided that justice would best
be served by allowing the parties to have their day in court.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE ON THE GROUND
OF FAILURE TO PROSECUTE.
When a trial judge has decided to grant or deny a
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, this court has stu
that it will not reverse the lower court's rulinq except for
abuse of discretion, to wit, that it is arbitrary, capricious,
or not based on adeauate findings of fact or on law.
Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 617

Pacer v.

(Utah 1975).

The lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Appellant's reguest for failure to prosecute because when the
motion was brought Respondent was diligently prosecuting this
action. 2 AM JUR. 2d §59 at page 51 states as follows:
"A motion to dismiss for want of prosecution
should not be granted if at the time of the
motion Plaintiff is diligently prosecuting his
claim, even though at some prior period of time he
had been guilty of gross negligence or neglect."
Appellant's reguest for failure to prosecute was not brought
until the first day of trial, at that time Responder,t was
diligently pursuing this action.
In discussing whether a motion for failure to prosecu:· '
1

should be granted this court has stated the followinq;
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases
with dispatch and to move calendars with
expedition in order to keep them UP to date.
But it is even more important to keep in
mind that the verv rea~on for the existence
Sponsored by the S.J.
Law Library.
digitization provided
by the Institute of Museum
and Library Services
ofQuinney
courts
isFunding
to fora~fo~d
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to be heard and to do justice between them.
In conformity with that principle the courts
generally tend to favor granting relief from
default judgments where there is any reasonable
excuse, unless it will result in substantial
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party."
(Emphasis added).
Westinghouse El. Sup. Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Con., Inc., 544 P.2d
876, (Utah 1975).
This court further stated in li-7estinqhouse, id,
at page 879 that:
"Whether there is such justifiable excuse is to
be tletermined by considering more factors ~
1.1erelv the lenqth of time since the suit was
flled.
Some consideration should be given to the
conduct of both parties, and to the opportunitv
each has had to move the case forward and what
they have done about it; and also what difficulty or
prejudice may have been caused to the other side;
and most important, whether injustice may result from
the dismissal." (Emphasis added).
Numerous other cases, which will not be cited, also
reiterate that time is only one factor out of many.
Accordingly, the length of time since the filing of the
suit is insufficient for reversal of the entire matter.

Action

had been taking place one year before trial up to trial itselfthat is prosecuting an action.

In applying the other factors

it is evident that the delay in prosecuting this case is
reasonably excusable in light of the various counsel that
plaintiff has had on the case, the complexity of the case, and
that had Appellant been anxious to proceed he could have taken
such affirmative steos himself, or file appropriate motions when
counsel was not acting.

-11-
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POINT V
APPELLANT'S REQUEST TO DISMISS BECAUSE OF LACHES
WAS CORRECTLY DENIED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE
In matters concerning laches this court has stated
the following:
"The existence of laches is one to be determined
primarily by the trial court; and reviewing courts will
not interfere with the exercise of the trial court's
discretion in the matter, unless it appears that a
manifest injustice has been done, o:r tr.e decision canna
reasonably be found to be sul-'}'orted by the 2vidence."
Papanikol"as Brothers Enterorises v. Sugarhouse Sh"ooping
Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975)
In the present case the trial judge did not abuse his

discret~

in denying Appellant's recruest for dismissal on laches, because
the prejudices complained of by Appellant were all created by
Appellant's unpreparedness and not by the delay. For example,
in the present case the Respondent never gave notice to Defend<
that this case was not being diligently prosecuted.

I

In fact,

Appellant knew 11 months before trial that pleadings were
being filed, 9 months prior to trial that his counsel had

/

withdrew, 8 months prior to trial when the trial date was sche:)
I

5 weeks before that a pre-trial was scheduled, 3 weeks before ~
at pretrial that Appellant would be reouired to be prepared
because no continuances would be allowed.

However, on the dad

of the trial Appellant had neither prepared himself nor

had~~

obtained counsel.

ResP~

had done.

This was not the results of anything

In fact it is obvious on page 2 of the trial trans·:
I

cript (R.79).

Appellant states: "Mr. Barker, I went into hi 5 /

office to find the file.

He says it's in his inactive file

had been searching three days ... "

The fact that onl\" three

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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seriously is not the fault of Respondent.

If a party himself

delays his own preparedness after knowing the schedule of upcoming
motions, or trials, the party so prepared should and must not
be

punish~d

or prejudiced by the one not prepared.

Based on

this record, the court properly denied Appellants motion for
a continuance.

Only after this did Appellant try to have this

case dismissed for laches.

This, the court appropriately denied.

If the Appellant had truly wanted to

ore~ent

the prejudices

mentioned he could have procured counsel, taken affirmative
steps to move the case forward, or at the very least reviewed
the file kept by his attorney who had withdrawn 8 months prior
to trial.

None of these steps were taken by the Appellant,

and thus the only thing left which Appellant could complain
of was the length of the delay.

However, for ourposes of finding

laches applicable to bar an action, mere passage of time does not
amount to the required prejudice.
451, 565 P.2d 1312
133, 505 P. 2d 710

Leon v. Byns, 115 Ariz.

(1977); see also Darby v. Keeran,

211 Kan.

(19 73) ; Leathers v. Commercial Nat' 1 Bank

in Muskogee, 410 P. 2d 541 {Oklahoma, 1966).
Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
when he denied Appellant's reauest for dismissal on laches;
because there was amole evidence to show that the injustice
complained of by Appellant was inflicted upon him by himself
and not by the delay.

Appropriate and timely steps taken by

the appellant himself would have solved his own problems.
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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CONCLUSION
The Appellant misrepresented on his public assistance
application forms essential inofrmation which is used to determine eligibility.

As a result of these misrepresentations,

Appellant obatined a substantial sum of money that he was not
entitled to receive.

A great injustice would occur to the State·

if Appellant, who perpetrated his fraud, is allowed to retain
these funds.

I

The arguments raised by Appellant for dismissing this
action have nothing to do with whether or not he cornrni tted fraud.

I

The arguments Appellant raises on appeal deal only with the

period of time between the filing of the complaint and the date~~

i

this action was tried on its merits.
Appellant's first three arguments concerning the answeri!·
of discovery requests, are nov> being raised for the first time
on appeal.

This court should not consider these arguments

because they were never raised in nor ruled upon by the trial
court.

Nonetheless, the court did not abuse its discretion,

the san-ctions are not self executing, and the matter was

proper!~

allowed to proceed.
On the other hand, even if the trial ludae can invoke
the sanctions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on his own

I
I

motion as Appellant contends, he chose not to do so after revi4
the record.

This argument as well as arguments of failure to

prosecute and laches are understood to be exerciseable "in t~
discretion of the trial court."

The trial judge did not abuse

his discretion by allowing this case to be tried on its meritsSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

l

Appellant does not cite any abuse or try to substantiate abuse
except citing delay of Respondent.

The court had ample evidence

to determine that the Appellant was in no particular hurry in
getting the pretrial discovery procedures completed, getting
on with trial, or even moving the court for relief prior to
trial.

Thus, the lower court, as the trier of fact, was in a

position to properly see the issues and evidence and ruled
properly in all aspects of this case.
The judgment for $11,981.21 plus costs should be
affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
ROBERT B. ~~SEN
Attorney General,

STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
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